Monetary policy credibility

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Chapter 6 in Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, Second Edition, 2019, pp 100-127 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Chapter 6 examines credibility issues concerning monetary policy. Frameworks are considered in which both policymakers and private sector agents act strategically. Potential time inconsistence issues when policy is conducted under discretion are addressed. The role of alternative central bank institutions is discussed.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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