Analytical jurisprudence and its discontents

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Chapter 1 in Understanding the Nature of Law, 2015, pp 17-42 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter identifies and explains three of the most important and recent challenges to the project of analytical jurisprudence, conceived as an exercise in conceptual analysis: (i) the objection that disputes about the boundaries of the concept of law are simply irresolvable, which in turn shows that conceptual analysis of law ought to be given up; (ii) the objection that conceptual analysis employs two problematic epistemological devices – a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths and appeals to intuition; and finally, (iii) the objection that the sheer variety of types of law makes pursuit of a single essence or concept of law meaningless.

Keywords: Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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