Analytical jurisprudence and necessity

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Chapter 4 in Understanding the Nature of Law, 2015, pp 90-110 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter introduces the view that many necessary truths about law that, for example, Hart defends, are neither analytic nor a priori truths, but are instead best understood as claims of a posteriori necessary truth. This chapter is designed as a counter-balance to Brian Leiter’s view that philosophers of law ought to consult Quine’s naturalized epistemology to resolve some longstanding internal disputes about the boundaries of law. Saul Kripke’s account of the separability of analyticity, a prioricity and necessity is just as important, if not more so, to employ.

Keywords: Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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