Corruption, organizational deviance and corporate compliance

Markus Pohlmann and Julian Klinkhammer

Chapter 8 in Handbook of the International Political Economy of the Corporation, 2018, pp 120-136 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The ‘business of bribery’ has repeatedly been identified as one of the key global crime problems, although corruption is but one among many forms of white-collar and corporate crime. This chapter introduces sociological and criminological perspectives on organizational deviance and applies them to the study of corruption. To this end, the authors show how to distinguish organizational from individual deviance, and exemplify the institutional approach. Case studies highlight the ambivalent role of the private sector in the fight against different types of organizational deviance. Implications for anti-corruption strategies and effective corporate compliance are discussed against the backdrop of a recent surge in law enforcement. A wave of corporate compliance rushes private companies to vertically integrate anti-corruption. Thus, in the current situation, the costs for hiding illegal practices and the risk of exposure are increasing in many countries. The authors contrast the dominant rational choice account with alternative institutional explanations and argue that the old institutionalism is particularly apt to explain the puzzling persistence of structural corruption in international business.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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