Playing for constitutional time: Interim constitutions and transitional provisions

Tom Ginsburg and Eric Alston

Chapter 5 in The Timing of Lawmaking, 2017, pp 110-129 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Regime transition is a central challenge in constitutional design. This chapter discusses two increasingly popular mechanisms to effectuate the transition between regimes: (i) interim constitutions; and (ii) transitional provisions. Both mechanisms involve the manipulation of temporality, limiting duration of what is supposed to be an enduring form. This chapter provides a theory of when these devices are useful, positive evidence of their use in national constitutions, and a discussion of normative considerations. Keywords: timing rules, constitutional transition, interim constitutions, transitional provisions

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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