Corruption and the New Institutional Economics

Miriam A. Golden

Chapter 19 in A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, 2018, pp 171-177 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Corruption is common in poor and middle-income countries, but relatively infrequent in wealthy ones. How does corruption decline with modernization? In this chapter, the author considers two ways that analytical tools that derive from the New Institutional Economics may contribute to a better understanding of corruption and modernization. First, even where laws prohibit corruption, it often persists. How do cultures of corruption develop, and how can they be changed? Second, how do anti-corruption interests organize politically to change institutions that facilitate patronage and discretion, replacing them with meritocratic, formula-bound ones?

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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