Central bank independence and the idea of money neutrality: re-considering the theoretical link

Ulas Sener

Chapter 8 in Progressive Post-Keynesian Economics, 2019, pp 96-110 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: There is a strong consensus view in mainstream macroeconomics, that monetary institutions must be depoliticized and independent from governments. A further economic conviction is that money could be mainly conceived as a neutral means of exchange. This paper argues that the consensus view, that central banks must be independent, has its roots in the paradigm of neutral money. As I will show from a heterodox perspective that there is no such thing as money neutrality, the theoretical foundations and conceptual roots of central bank independence are controversial and its political economic narrative is shaky. To overcome these contradictions, pluralism in economics teaching is necessary. In order to grasp and understand the implications of the non-neutrality of money, the curriculum of monetary theory and policy has to consider heterodox theoretical approaches to money.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788119870/9781788119870.00015.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:18368_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().