Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions

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Chapter 5 in Explaining Constitutional Change, 1999, pp 87-106 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This book aims to extend the current research and debate in constitutional economics by using a positive economics approach. Born out of discontent with the current state in constitutional economics, this book presents an inquiry in the possibilities of a positive constitutional economics, and how societies choose their constitutional rules.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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