 Building the theory: majoritarian electoral systems and party integration. Chapter 2 in Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, 2019, pp 22-52 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: We develop a comparative analysis of democratic decentralization (subnational elections) versus centralization (national elections) for economies with majoritarian electoral systems and party integration (the ability of party leaders to control the nomination of candidates in local and national elections). We identify a strong decentralization theorem that shows that decentralization dominates centralization even when local public goods show spillovers and the central government differentiates local public goods across localities. Our analysis shows that subnational elections create incentives for electoral accountability and politicians are persuaded to provide the goods and services desired by residents of each locality. In addition, party integration creates incentives for local policy coordination and local politicians to recognize the externalities of local public goods in other localities. As a result, local public goods under democratic decentralization and party integration are Pareto efficient and the regional distribution of public goods match the heterogeneous preferences of residents across localities. Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:18495_2 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.