Building the theory: proportional representation and open party lists

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Chapter 5 in Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, 2019, pp 106-133 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: We study the relative benefits of democratic decentralization (subnational elections) versus centralization (national elections) for economies with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and open party lists (party leaders control the nomination but voters control the order of candidates in the party`s list in local and national elections). Elections and the institution of open party lists induce politicians to recognize the benefits and costs of local public spending in each locality. In addition, the institution of open party lists could create incentives for local policy coordination, and candidates might recognize the externalities of local public goods in other localities. We show that the relative merits of democratic decentralization versus centralization are critically dependent on elections and the political institution of open party lists in proportional representation electoral systems.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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