Decentralization and integrated parties: summarizing the models

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Chapter 6 in Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, 2019, pp 134-138 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: We discuss the implications of all of our theoretical models for the provision of local public goods for economies with different electoral systems (majoritarian versus proportional) and different political institutions for the process of nomination of candidates (from closed open party lists systems to primary elections). Our key finding is that, in the case of both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, the political institutions leading most consistently to the best outcomes in the allocation of local public goods are party integration (the ability of party leaders to control the nomination of candidates in local and national elections) and democratic decentralization (subnational elections).

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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