 Empirically testing the role of political institutions. Chapter 7 in Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, 2019, pp 139-163 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: In this chapter, we test our theoretical propositions by examining whether political institutions do indeed affect the efficiency with which local public goods are provided. More specifically, we evaluate the key expectation stemming from our theory: that the combination of democratic decentralization and party integration will lead to the best delivery of local public goods with externalities, other things equal. To do this, we make use of a series of quantitative models of all electorally competitive countries from 1975 to 2007 (contingent on data availability), to our knowledge the broadest examination of subnational political institutions in the literature. We employ seven different measures of education policy, seven different measures of health policy, and nine different measures of infrastructure policy to operationalize our dependent variable. For the right side of the equation, we develop an original dataset of subnational political institutions. Our models provide broad support for our theoretical expectations. Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:18495_7 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.