Fiscal federalism

.

Chapter 2 in Federalism in China and Russia, 2019, pp 8-38 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter compares the development of fiscal federalism in Russia and China. It looks at the evolution of expenditure and revenue decentralization in both countries, compares the allocation of tax legislation authority and tax collection responsibility, and briefly discusses the fiscal equalization mechanisms established in these two countries. The chapter also debates the role of sub-national public debt, which has emerged as a major problem in both China and Russia. Finally, it considers the role of non-tax revenue as a crucial source of income for Chinese provinces and sub-provincial territorial units, and its implications for the incentives of regional and local state officials. The chapter concludes that, while the Chinese fiscal constitution has a number of advantages compared to the Russian system (in particular the residual claim on revenues by sub-national governments), Russia and China are similar in several other aspects of the way fiscal federalism is organized.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788972185/05_chapter2.xhtml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:18496_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().