Bureaucratic incentives

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Chapter 3 in Federalism in China and Russia, 2019, pp 39-69 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter reviews the system of incentives established by the Russian and the Chinese central governments for their sub-national bureaucrats. After a historical overview of the organization of regional bureaucracy in both countries, it focuses on how selection and promotion of officials functioned in China and in Russia since the onset of reforms. It concludes that, while in China both formal and informal goals incentivized bureaucrats to focus on improving the economic performance of their region (although with a number of exceptions: thus, for high-level promotions in China, personal connections and networks gain crucial importance), in Russia incentives for bureaucrats make them care less about growth, and more about showing unconditional loyalty to the political leadership.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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