‘Big Men’ and poor voters: political corruption and elections in Kenya

Michelle D’Arcy

Chapter 3 in Political Corruption in Africa, 2019, pp 52-70 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter assesses the various forms of corruption that occur during elections in Kenya, and probes whether power-preserving and/or extractive political corruption are at play. Drawing on qualitative interviews conducted with candidates and campaign officials during the 2013 gubernatorial campaigns in four counties in Kenya, it shows how voter-driven demand for politicians to act in particular culturally prescribed ways fuels practices before and during elections – such as patronage and vote buying – that many see as forms of corruption. While these behaviours are power preserving in helping incumbents win re-election, they are also culturally expected within the ‘Big Man’ mould of African politics and they are rational in terms of the incentives that poor voters are facing. However, these expectations and the rationale create incentives for extractive corruption. Besides, the prohibitive costs of campaigning, in a context of poor campaign funding and controls, create strong incentives for politicians to engage in extractive corruption to finance their campaigns. Cumulatively, these observations suggest that elections, and the expectations of voters, are one of the significant drivers of political corruption in Kenya.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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