Stuck in transition: political corruption as power abuse

Inge Amundsen

Chapter 9 in Political Corruption in Africa, 2019, pp 175-188 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The final chapter summarises some of the findings of the previous country analyses, against the background of the conceptual pair of extractive and power-preserving political corruption. It is argued that the power-preserving form of political corruption, fed by extractive political corruption, is holding back democratic developments in Sub-Sahara Africa. It is also argued that the perspective on the extractive and power-preserving practices of the ruling elite is important, particularly when the two mechanisms of political corruption feed into each other, creating an evil circle of extraction and reinvestment in power: when ruling elites engage in extractive corruption to preserve their power, and this power is abused to extract further. It is concluded that this seems to be the case in most of the country examples in this book. It can be deducted from the analyses that the riches extracted through political corruption to a large extent are providing the means to retain control of the state. Numerous examples are presented of situations in which the proceeds of extraction are reinvested in power, which goes way beyond the usual understanding of extractive corruption as driven by greed. An effective restriction of these regime-enhancing forms of political corruption seems to require an economic crisis and sustained and politically skilled external and internal pressures.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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