The Lender of Last Resort in a General Equilibrium Framework
Akshay Kotak,
Han Ozsoylev and
Dimitrios Tsomocos
Chapter 5 in Financial Regulation and Stability, 2019, pp 113-157 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This paper models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework. We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trigger default, leading to deterioration in the value of bank assets, and subsequent bank illiquidity in some states of the world. LoLR intervention is then assessed with regards to its economy-wide effect on welfare, bank profitability, and the level of default. The results provide a rationalization for constructive ambiguity and the ‘too big to fail’ problem.
Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788973649.00010.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:18568_5
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().