Revisiting the theory of judicial councils

Nuno Garoupa

Chapter 16 in Research Handbook on Judging and the Judiciary, 2025, pp 316-331 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In an earlier work, we offered a positive theory of judicial councils based on the difficult balance between independence and accountability. More recently, new research proposed an alternative theory based on social preferences by voters and activists, rather than political economy. We explore the similarities and differences between both theories as well as their ability to explain recent trends in judicial governance. We discuss election rules to the council, fragmentation of judicial associations, polarisation, democratic backsliding, and revolving doors.

Keywords: Judicial councils; Independence; Accountability; Political economy; Social preferences; Institutional design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781788978736
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