Business interest groups and tax policy

Néstor Castañeda

Chapter 25 in Handbook on the Politics of Taxation, 2021, pp 388-404 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In this chapter, I explore under which circumstances business interest groups are more or less likely to impose their tax policy preferences. I argue that progressive governments can implement redistributive tax policies only if business interest groups are weakly or not centrally coordinated for collective action. I use the implementation of recent tax reforms in Latin America to illustrate this argument.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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