The evolution of competitive retail electricity markets

Stephen Littlechild

Chapter 5 in Handbook on Electricity Markets, 2021, pp 111-155 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The creation of retail electricity markets generally involved a transitional price cap. In the US, by contrast, California rescinded retail competition, Texas adopted the UK approach, and 14 other US states obliged incumbent network utilities to provide a "default tariff" reflecting wholesale costs.In the US, Australia and New Zealand, and the UK there was evidence of increasingcompetition,but critics interpreted price differentials as evidence of a lack of competition. With increasing concern for vulnerable customers, some jurisdictions introduced price caps. Evidence about retail markets and the effects of regulation is much disputed. The policy context is changing. In the radically different future electricity systems and markets involving "prosumers" engaged in off-grid generation, storage and peer-to-peer trading in a decarbonising world,the innovation and customer response associated with full retail competition will be more, not less, important.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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