Behavioural economics of morality and sustainability

Shinji Teraji

Chapter 20 in Handbook of Research Methods in Behavioural Economics, 2023, pp 353-368 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Conventional economics has argued that people only cooperate for fear of external constraints such as punishments. Following this view, common-pool resources could be sustainably governed with external, economic incentives. However, people exhibit pro-social behaviour when they do not always make choices only based on external incentives. Extrinsic monetary rewards to encourage pro-social behaviour can sometimes crowd out intrinsic motivation to act pro-socially. While economic incentives can manipulate people into being more selfish, social incentives will give prominence to the role of non-pecuniary drivers of pro-social behaviour. This chapter discusses the issue of governing the commons with social incentives. Individuals who consider resource conservation to be a major concern are driven by social incentives. Besides material payoff, agents with pro-environmental preferences obtain psychological payoff related to resource conservation. A society can be sustainable to the degree that its members embody such social preferences.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Research Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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