The collective risk social dilemma

Manfred Milinski

Chapter 10 in Research Handbook on Environmental Sociology, 2021, pp 168-186 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Is a group able to assemble a collective target through repeated individual contributions with everybody suffering if the target is missed? Prevention of dangerous climate change is the most challenging version of this 'collective risk social dilemma'. Free riding leads easily to disaster both in experiments and in the real climate change game. Inspired by negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions reductions a collective risk social dilemma can be studied that involves representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members investing their money. Selfish extortionate players are preferentially elected enforcing fair representatives to compensate missing investments towards the climate goal. Migration induced by climate events and resulting poverty enforces a Nash Distribution of inhabitants between a poor and a rich country, which the rich fail to prevent. Climate change in the overall collective risk social dilemma is here rarely averted. Intergenerational discounting prevents investing enough to rescue the climate for future generations.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment; Sociology and Social Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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