The constitutional point of view

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Chapter 10 in Neoliberal Social Justice, 2021, pp 110-122 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Public choice theory predicts that legislators often focus on maintaining a coalition of supporters to maintain power, and that unelected officials must contend with competition for power and status within their administrative units. These imperatives tend to be misaligned with broader conceptions of the public good. Rawls and some of his defenders contest the empirical validity of these claims and suggest that the ethos of public choice, especially the presumption of economic self-interest, is at odds with the underlying normative project of democracy. Public choice scholars have proposed starting with unanimity at a constitutional moment as a process of justifying democratic institutions. I suggest that this solution is unrealistic but an alternative approach, that includes public choice as part of public reason, can help reconcile Rawlsian aspirations with the problem of self-interest in everyday politics.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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