Basic economic liberties and the moral powers

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Chapter 12 in Neoliberal Social Justice, 2021, pp 134-143 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Rawls prioritises a limited set of basic liberties that together are supposed to be fully adequate for the development of citizens’ moral powers. This distinguishes his theory of justice from other moral theories such as utilitarianism. Rawls explicitly excludes economic liberties from being basic. John Tomasi contests this rejection by arguing that economic activity contributes to the capacity of citizens to engage in the responsible self-authorship closely linked to democratic values. Tomasi’s case has been met with scepticism by contemporary Rawlsians who fear that economic liberty has the capacity to undermine the value of other liberties, especially political participation. They argue that participation in economic activity has little importance for the development of moral capacities. However, parallel concerns apply to those other liberties presumed to be basic; therefore rejection of economic liberty on those grounds is not definitive.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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