The political economy of transport pricing and investment

Bruno De Borger and Antonio Russo

Chapter 7 in Handbook on Transport Pricing and Financing, 2023, pp 124-144 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In this chapter, we bring together several major insights derived from theoretical and empirical models that economists have used to understand the political economy underlying transport policy decisions. The chapter reviews the literature on the political economy of transport pricing and infrastructure provision, and considers empirical studies that emphasize the political determinants of traffic law enforcement. The chapter ends with some interesting avenues for future research. Together, the various models convincingly explain the widely observed opposition to tolls and cordon charges, and why low emission zones and parking fees are politically easier to introduce than congestion charges. The literature further shows how democratic voting procedures may lead to excessive investment, and how coalition formation implies a positive bias towards regions politically represented in the coalition. Finally, the literature emphasises the role of information and voter attention in political outcomes.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment; Geography; Politics and Public Policy Urban and Regional Studies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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