Modernising the Demos: institutional architecture and procedural mechanics in public law

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Chapter 8 in An Economic Analysis of Public Law, 2021, pp 166-186 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: For economic analysis, public law is mainly a matter of institutional architecture and procedural mechanics. The criterion for designing non-consensual institutions shall be their ability to efficiently serve their constitutional mandates. I apply this for examining the various structures of the “administrative/regulatory State†(Parliament and Government, central Administration, local authorities, independent agencies, state companies) and the delegation of powers among them, which is a principal/agent strategic game. Procedural rules are also crucial for increasing the quality of collective choices and for neutralizing opportunism. Modern legal orders (including the EU) have shaped a procedural ius commune for reaching all types of public decisions. They establish better regulation and impact assessment tools to evaluate the efficiency of regulatory options together with enhanced transparency and public participation (consultation processes) to counter information asymmetries and regulatory capture.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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