Can EU merger control resist the turn towards protectionism?
Anu Bradford
Chapter 14 in Research Handbook on Global Merger Control, 2023, pp 352-366 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This chapter examines whether the EU merger control has been, or will likely be, deployed towards protectionist ends. The European Commission has frequently been accused of deliberately targeting foreign - especially U.S. - acquirers, while facilitating the creation of European national champions. To assess the validity of these claims, this chapter first examines the EU’s past merger enforcement record. An analysis of the over 5,000 mergers reported to the Commission in 1990-2014 reveals no evidence that the Commission would have systematically deployed its authority to advance protectionist goals. The discussion then turns to the present, explaining how some member states are calling for the rethinking of EU competition law through a lens of industrial policy in light of the heightened global competition that European companies are facing. The last part of the chapter cautions against such a change in the EU’s enforcement philosophy and explains why a neutral, non-protectionist merger enforcement is vital for European competitiveness and economic dynamism going forward.
Keywords: Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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