Allocative efficiency in EU antitrust law

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Chapter 5 in The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis in Law and Economics, 2022, pp 97-137 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The analysis of the dataset about EU antitrust law is divided into three. First, materials pertaining to Article 101 TFEU are reverse engineered. Next, the analysis focuses on Article 102 TFEU. Finally, the dataset is divided into pecuniary and non-pecuniary sanctions. The reverse engineering delivers a clear result: the consumer welfare hypothesis fits better than the total welfare hypothesis with EU antitrust law.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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