CEO celebrity and premiums

Russell Fralich and Andrew Papadopoulos

Chapter 21 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Mergers and Acquisitions, 2026, pp 59-60 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter explores the influence of CEO celebrity on mergers and acquisitions premiums. Bidder CEOs often pay lower premiums due to risk sensitivity, while celebrity target CEOs increase firm visibility, raising perceived value but risking overpayment. The chapter examines the role of media-driven reputations, behavioral biases, and halo effects in shaping valuation decisions, highlighting the complex interplay between CEO status, negotiation dynamics, and strategic outcomes.

Keywords: CEO; Celebrity; M&A; Premiums; Bidder; Target (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781800880856
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