Hostile takeovers

Duncan N. Angwin

Chapter 75 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Mergers and Acquisitions, 2026, pp 195-196 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines hostile takeovers, where acquirers bypass the target management to appeal directly to shareholders. It discusses motivations, such as disciplining underperforming management, and outcomes like leadership turnover and restructuring. Historical examples and regulatory contexts are analyzed, alongside the debates on hostile takeovers’ societal and economic impacts. The chapter highlights their prevalence in mature markets but notes their rarity in emerging markets due to regulatory barriers.

Keywords: Hostile takeovers; Market for corporate control; Agency problem; CEO turnover; Corporate governance; Origins; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781800880856
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781800880863.00081 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:20450_75

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().