The political economy of aid in African states

Ken Ochieng’ Opalo

Chapter 7 in Handbook of Aid and Development, 2024, pp 110-126 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter describes the political economy of foreign aid in African states using the specific example of Uganda. The chapter presents two core arguments. First, that African states have been able to retain their agency and relative policy autonomy despite high levels of aid dependence. This can be explained by donors’ motivations for giving aid (e.g., foreign policy, ideational commitment to fighting poverty, self-interested tied aid, etc.) and African states’ ability to position themselves as important trusted allies to donors. Second, that unpacking donors’ domestic institutional and political motivations for giving aid increases our understanding of why donors and multilateral organizations often fail in their efforts to leverage foreign aid for specific policy and developmental ends in low-income states.

Keywords: Development Studies; Geography; Politics and Public Policy Sociology and Social Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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