The politics of the OECD

Magdaléna Hadjiisky

Chapter 5 in The Elgar Companion to the OECD, 2023, pp 50-66 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Because it does not have at its disposal the same kind of binding instruments as the European Union (supranational legislation) or the World Bank (loans’ conditionality), the OECD is often described as an ‘expert organisation’, whose reach depends not on power relations but on the credit given to its analytical output. Far from being neutral, however, the expertisation of international relationships helps create a general authority whose scope extends beyond the juxtaposition of national interests. After having addressed the question of the place of politics in intergovernmental organizations, this chapter explores the part played by multi-actor negotiation in the concrete power exercised by the OECD. Escaping the classic binary alternative between politics as diplomatic mandate and politics as global framing, the OECD builds its legitimacy thanks to a method-driven governmentality, which requires the continuous co-optation of elite segments of national executives.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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