Public choice as the economics of politics: its post-war origin

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Chapter 1 in Rethinking Public Choice, 2022, pp 1-17 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Public choice received its name in 1968 and was a product of post-war developments in economic theory. Those developments centered on refining the theory of economic equilibrium in conjunction with using economics to assist in strategic cold-war planning. In the early statements of that theory, politics stood outside the domain of equilibrium theory even though cold-war planning was the domain of governments. Public choice came into existence as such theorists as Anthony Downs, Duncan Black, James Buchanan, Gordon and Tullock sought to incorporate political activity into the ambit of equilibrium theory. Around 1900, such theorists as Antonio de Viti de Marco, Vilfredo Pareto, and Joseph Schumpeter also sought to incorporate political activity into economics, but their efforts were stillborn. This chapter explores some of the significant conceptual challenges that must be confronted by any effort to bring economics and politics onto the same analytical plane.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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