Eden, Babel, and some dialectics of constituting social order

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Chapter 12 in Rethinking Public Choice, 2022, pp 153-164 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The branch of public choice known as constitutional political economy treats people as choosing their constitutional arrangements similarly to how they choose among possible types of poker they will play. What arises is an "East of Eden" mode of thought where the analysis posits consensus among participants prior to any choice of constitutional arrangements. The prime public choice problem within this scheme of thought is to restrict rent seeking and predation by coalitions. In contrast, this chapter pursues a "West of Babel" framework where consensus is not something to be assumed for analytical simplicity but is one emergent historical possibility among many possibilities in an open world. Whether consensus is ever attained or the extent to which it might be attained in history is an outcome of complex social processes of governance, the examination of which is the prime object this chapter addresses.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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