The peculiar language of the public policy shell game

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Chapter 7 in Rethinking Public Choice, 2022, pp 87-100 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Within a half-century, James Burnham (1944), Louis Eisenstein (1961), and Vincent Ostrom (1997) each called attention to the misleading language of politics. The terms used sounded objective and meaningful but were nothing of the sort. To the contrary, they were the speaker's aspiration masquerading in the language of scientific objectivity. This dual use of language corresponds to the form of shell game where the organizer of the game seeks to divert the attention of the players. Like a shell game, discourse regarding public policy operates with two languages. A direct language is suitable for discussants who are seeking to arrive at some truth. An indirect or deceptive language is suitable for debaters who are seeking to sway an audience. This distinction between discussion and debate raises some challenging questions regarding the norms of democratic governance which I illuminate using Vilfredo Pareto's (1915) distinction between logical and non-logical action.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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