Responsibility avoidance in the World Bank’s approach to end poverty

Antje Vetterlein

Chapter 24 in The Elgar Companion to the World Bank, 2024, pp 286-297 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The aim of this chapter is to trace the Bank’s changing policies in the field of poverty reduction. Doing so, I show that the organization’s policy reforms can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid responsibility for policy failure. Given the persistence of poverty over the past decades, the Bank has come under pressure to provide explanations and new policies to govern this problem. The politicization literature shows how increased public attention leads IOs to engage in practices of self-legitimization and blame management. I argue that such practices are also reflected in the design of IO policies. Specifically, I observe how the design of some Bank policies leads to avoiding responsibilities by delegating it to other actors, diffusing it across actors, or ascribing it to events beyond the organization’s control. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of responsibility avoidance.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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