Rational choice: actors, preferences and power

Randall W. Stone

Chapter 6 in The Elgar Companion to the World Bank, 2024, pp 74-84 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Debates about the World Bank in political science frequently revolve around the choice of theoretically interesting actors. A review of recent empirical work suggests that the most important principals are the US president and the US Congress. Other countries have much less influence, and while non-governmental actors can play important roles at key junctures, they exercise their influence by lobbying the US Congress. Principal-agent problems in the Bank are addressed by selecting staff who internalize US policy preferences, but they can reemerge when US preferences shift and Bank procedures and incentives fail to adapt.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781802204780.00017 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:21163_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().