The World Bank Inspection Panel from an institutionalist perspective

Alexsandro Eugenio Pereira

Chapter 7 in The Elgar Companion to the World Bank, 2024, pp 85-95 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The objective of this chapter is to analyze the World Bank Inspection Panel based on the institutionalist theoretical perspective of International Relations. As such, the chapter is organized into three main sections. In the first section, I present the basic premises of institutionalist theory. In the following section, I show how the demand for legitimacy imposed on international organizations influences the context under which these organizations create accountability mechanisms. I understand these mechanisms as institutional innovations resulting from the demand for legitimacy. In the third section, I explore how problems in the institutional design of the Inspection Panel limit its effectiveness as an accountability mechanism, without ignoring that this mechanism enables to question the behavior of the World Bank as well as of the member states that receive resources from the World Bank to finance its development projects.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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