Addressing Common Ownership Through Abuse of Collective Dominance

Giorgio Monti

Chapter 14 in Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law, 2025, pp 271-287 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter explores the extent to which the notion of abuse of collective dominance may be applied to the anticompetitive effects resulting from common ownership. After explaining under what circumstances common shareholding may show the existence of a position of collective dominance, the chapter explores what kinds of abusive conduct may be challenged. It is argued that a systematic intervention based on higher prices resulting from common ownership is not possible, but that some actions by common shareholders to influence the conduct of directors may be treated as abuse of collective dominance. Even if an abuse is found, the final section discusses the challenges in identifying the optimal remedy.

Keywords: Collective Dominance; Abuse; Structural Remedies; Common Ownership; Excessive Pricing; Article 102 TFEU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803920542
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