Interlocking Directorates in the United States
Yaron Nili
Chapter 15 in Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law, 2025, pp 288-309 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
In corporate America, directors wield increasing influence across multiple companies, often within the same industry (“horizontal directors”), which creates tension between antitrust laws and corporate governance. Horizontal directors are well-positioned to bring industry expertise and potentially increase higher profits, benefiting shareholders but also possibly enabling potential collusion. This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence of horizontal directors, the regulatory grey space in which they exist and the connection to some recently debated issues, including that of common ownership by institutional investors. To inform this debate, this chapter provides a thorough overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives employing theoretical and empirical research. This chapter concludes with a discussion of recent enforcement actions by both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, illustrating the increased attention to the topic by both regulators and academics alike.
Keywords: Horizontal Directors; Antitrust Law; Corporate Governance; Shareholder Value; Consumer Protection; Common Ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803920542
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