 Managerial Liability, Managerial Duties, and Liability Within Corporate Groups: Optimal Competition Law Sanctions by Rearranging the Deckchairs Within the Undertaking?Florian Wagner- von Papp Chapter 23 in Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law, 2025, pp 474-534 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: This chapter analyses the incentive effects of competition law sanctions when the sanction is shifted between various constituent elements within the infringing undertaking, be it to its managers or be it to other corporate entities within a corporate group. It discusses several cases dealing with the question of whether undertakings may seek indemnification for corporate fines from its managers; it argues that such indemnification should not be permissible because this would ultimately allow the shifting of the fine to directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance and impair the effectiveness of the fine. It also argues that effective compliance schemes endogenously reduce the ex ante expected fine and therefore do not justify an additional ex post bonus. The single economic entity doctrine that imposes not only parental liability but also occasionally the subsidiary's liability for parental infringements is justified as a return to the principle of responsibility which is too often undermined by limited liability. Keywords: Manager Liability; Indemnification; Compliance Schemes; Optimal Sanctions; Concept of Undertaking; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:21434_23 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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