Antitrust law as a regulator of competition

Sandeep Vaheesan

Chapter 13 in Research Handbook on Law and Political Economy, 2025, pp 209-221 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In the United States, judges, antitrust officials, and scholars describe the antitrust laws as being “designed for the protection of competition, not competitors.” According to this perspective, enforcers and courts should not be concerned with injuries to competitors from business rivalry, only with “harm to competition” (typically defined as conduct that reduces short-term output). This prevailing view, however, is a misrepresentation of the law. Business rivalry is not a free for all in which firms can use any means to obtain a competitive advantage, but rather a process structured by myriad laws, including antitrust law. Even with the judicial weakening of antitrust rules on permissible competitive methods since the late 1970s, federal antitrust law restricts certain forms of competition and protects competitors injured by these competitive tactics. For example, the Sherman Act prohibits the tying of separate goods by a firm with power, and rivals injured by such tying are entitled to damages and injunctive relief. The Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts also restrict below-cost pricing and deceptive advertising by firms. As a descriptive matter, antitrust law restricts competition and protects competitors. Specifically, it limits firms’ discretion to use their market power, financial power, and practices against public policy as methods of competition and grants rivals protection against them.

Keywords: Antitrust; Business rivalry; Fair competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803921181
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