The new global dis/order in central banking and public finance

Timothy A. Canova

Chapter 20 in Research Handbook on Law and Political Economy, 2025, pp 313-338 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Central banks are widely recognized for their vast financial powers and the pivotal role they play in shaping the political economy of nations. The US Federal Reserve is widely seen as the most powerful of the world's central banks and one of the primary catalysts of financial globalization and the related shift to a more orthodox and liberalized political economy. Law clearly plays an important role, providing the institutional structure of central bank governance and vesting central banks with vast discretionary authority in the conduct of monetary and regulatory policies. A review of the law's changing contours reveals the flaws in today's political economy of central banking while suggesting alternative paths for reform.

Keywords: Agency capture; Appointments clause; Banking bailout; Banking crisis; Central bank autonomy; Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs); Central bank independence; Federal Reserve; Financial crisis; Financial fascism; Great Depression; Keynesian economics; Lender of last resort; Monetary policy; Mortgage-Backed Security Purchase Program (MBSPP); New Deal; Private central banks; Private non-delegation doctrine; Public choice theory; Quantitive Easing (QE); Regional federal reserve banks; Standing doctrine; Transparency; Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803921181
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