International trade solidarity governance split: Bretton Woods solidarity vs Bandung solidarity

Harrison Otieno Mbori

Chapter 7 in Research Handbook on International Solidarity and the Law, 2024, pp 178-202 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Harrison Mbori argues that international trade law, policy, and institutionalism are founded and practiced within a continued imperial and colonial economic framework. This framework is directly antagonistic to other forms of solidarity, such as decolonial transnational solidarity and social and worker movement-led solidarity. The effect of this international trade law governance framework is the production of outcomes that are highly disadvantageous to developing and vulnerable individuals and communities within the principles, rules, and policies of the leading international trade law governance institution, the World Trade Law Organization (WTO). Using a Third World Approaches to International law (TWAIL) analytical frame, Mbori explicates this argument by demarcating solidarity within international trade law governance into an imperfect dichotomy of two poles: Bretton Wood solidarity and Bandung solidarity. He argues that Bretton Woods solidarity focuses on the narrow self-interest of states in the Global North and embodies a continuity of empire: colonialism and imperialism. Bandung solidarity, on the other hand, represents a move towards an anti-colonial, anti-racist international economic governance and strives towards the real emancipation of vulnerable members of the global society, especially the ones continually invisible to international law, such as the impoverished, indigenous communities, refugees, farmworkers, and many vulnerable women and children.

Keywords: Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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