EU competition policy

Bernardo Rangoni and Mark Thatcher

Chapter 17 in Handbook of European Union Governance, 2025, pp 243-258 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter argues that dominant characterisations of EU competition policy - whether emphasizing the neo-liberal centralization of powers that allegedly forecloses industrial policy or, conversely, the under-enforcement of these powers - overlook the gradual emergence of an ‘experimentalist’ architecture. We trace the development of this architecture - which co-exists with legally concentrated powers - in the vital case of state aid, beginning with the adoption of a Temporary Framework for state aid measures in 2008 and culminating in its latest transformation into the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework in 2023. We suggest that these state aid frameworks are temporary in name only. The rapid succession of distinct ‘temporary’ frameworks can be interpreted asreflect the gradual institutionalization of an experimentalist architecture - one that is recursively revised in response to unpredictable and rapidly unfolding crises. Furthermore, we argue that this architecture has served as a means for advancing key industrial policy goals, notably supporting Europe's small and medium-sized enterpreses and the long-term objective of the green transition. We conclude by offering wider implications for EU competition policy - a core part of the EU's economic governance, and a prime example for broader debates about European integration and policymaking.

Keywords: Competition policy; Industrial policy; Experimentalist governance; Neo-liberalism; State aid; Under-enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803925172
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781803925189.00029 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:21661_17

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().