Russian federalism, blame defection, and regime stability

Regina Smyth and Aidan Klein

Chapter 25 in Handbook on Subnational Governments and Governance, 2024, pp 358-374 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The evolution of Russian illiberalism put federal relations at the center of the Kremlin’s strategy to maintain regime stability. Beginning in 2000, President Vladimir Putin reestablished central control through budgetary reform and the construction of a hegemonic party, United Russia, that integrated governors into a system known as the power vertical. To insulate the regime, the Kremlin devolved policy implementation and innovation to regional officials, shifting blame for governance failures. We test the effect of this strategy on public opinion following the imposition of unpopular regulations during the COVID-19 crisis. Using regional survey data, we rely on a measure of trust to explore the conditions under which blame defection preserves presidential ratings at the governors’ expense. Our analysis demonstrates that individual attitudes strongly condition the effect of unpopular policy on both gubernatorial and presidential trust but that gubernatorial dependence on the federal center undermines the blame deflection strategy, disproportionately decreasing presidential ratings.

Keywords: Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy Urban and Regional Studies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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