Governance of airline competition in the European Union

Frank Fichert and Ralf Vogler

Chapter 18 in Research Handbook on Air Transport Leadership and Governance, 2025, pp 295-306 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter discusses the governance of airline competition in the European Union (EU). Since the late 1990s, the Intra-European air transport market has been liberalised and subject to the general rules of competition law. However, some specific regulations apply, for example, for slot allocation. One particular governance feature of European competition policy is the allocation of competencies between European and state levels. In most cases, the task of prohibiting airlines’ anticompetitive behaviour is assigned to the European level. Some specific market segments remain in the jurisdiction of national competition authorities. Another particularity of the European market is the relatively high number of state-owned airlines, providing a strong incentive for policymakers at the state level to protect these carriers. Consequently, the governance structure has to prevent state aid and other protectionist measures that not only distort competition in the Intra-European market but might also affect the position of EU airlines when competing with Non-EU carriers. More recently, European competition policy has also tried to prevent distortions to competition that result from subsidies granted by national or regional airports or other bodies. In these cases, primarily private low-cost carriers benefit from state aid.

Keywords: Competition policy; Competition law; Subsidies; State ownership; Merger; Market dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803926971
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