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Political institutions and the corruption of politics

Oksana Huss, Alice Mattoni and Fernanda Odilla

Chapter 29 in Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, 2024, pp 467-482 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter introduces the ‘players and arenas’ framework to assess corruption within political institutions. Central to the argument is acknowledging that corruption arises when actors from varied arenas exploit legal and illegal channels to influence policy and politics, often disadvantaging less powerful and influential counterparts. The chapter explores interactions among players across five key arenas - policy, law enforcement, civil society, media, and the market - to better understand the role of corruption in the nuanced interplay between power dynamics and legal/illegal practices in decision-making during different policy cycle phases. By examining practices such as lobbying, political finance, revolving doors, and media capture, the chapter discusses their links to corruption and consequences for political institutions. The ‘players and arenas’ framework aims to work as an analytical approach, addressing the demand for empirical and conceptual insights into the corruption of politics and the multiple undue influence channels and biases in law-making, law-enforcement, and public spending.

Keywords: Politics; and; Public; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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