The efficacy of market-driven voluntary governance mechanisms for decent work
Tim Connor,
Kate Macdonald and
Shelley Marshall
Chapter 31 in The Elgar Companion to Decent Work and the Sustainable Development Goals, 2025, pp 382-395 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
Recent years have witnessed the rising prominence of the decent work agenda, amidst an expanding array of declarations affirming a commitment to decent work. Yet barriers to achieving decent work for marginalized workers around the world have persisted, and in some respects intensified. This chapter explores this paradox through investigation of contested efforts to govern working conditions in transnational supply chains via mechanisms of market-driven voluntary governance. The chapter reflects on the sources of leverage these mechanisms draw on, their interactions with other voluntary and mandatory governance mechanisms, and their potential and limitations as means of supporting decent work. It is argued that to understand both the potential of market-driven voluntary governance mechanisms and also their persistent failings, we need to conceptualize such mechanisms as operating through fields of power struggle between those seeking to legitimize ‘business as usual’, and those attempting to harness these mechanisms as instruments of leverage to promote more decent work practices in global supply chains.
Keywords: Business and Management; Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Sociology and Social Policy; Sustainable Development Goals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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