The Ombuds’ role in holding states accountable for human rights violations: persuasion and legal mechanisms

Carlos Alberto Alza

Chapter 17 in Research Handbook on Accountability for Human Rights Violations, 2025, pp 297-318 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Since its inception in Sweden, the ‘Ombuds’ has undergone a process of transposition to other latitudes. In some contexts, it has shifted from being a mere watchdog of public administration to a protector of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law, and governance in relation to public authorities. Today, the latter is recognised as a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). The human rights and hybrid Ombuds models, widely adopted in Spain, Portugal, Latin America, and increasingly in Europe and Africa, call upon the State to demonstrate accountability for its actions that may threaten or violate human rights. This entails the State reporting (answerability), responding (responsiveness), and taking responsibility (responsibility/enforcement). While usually lacking direct sanctioning powers, the Ombuds primarily relies on persuasion and other tools. These extend beyond the typical function of addressing citizen complaints to include, in some cases, initiating judicial actions for rights protection, submitting amicus curiae briefs, publishing reports, and bringing cases before international jurisdictions. Public authorities are often subject to political influences, vested interests, corruption, or ideological conflicts. In contrast, the Ombuds operates with autonomy, political independence, and acts as a persuasive voice of reason in public debate. It employs a rights-based approach in its practice. Described as ‘toothless’, but possessing significant persuasive ‘claw’, the Ombuds is a key institution for realising rights through its demand for state accountability.

Keywords: Accountability; Human rights; Ombuds; Ombudsperson; Ombudsman; Persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035306923
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